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LESSONS FROM THE WORLD TRADE 
CENTER FOR OPEN SPACE PLANNING 
GENERALLY AND BOSTON’S BIG DIG 
SPECIFICALLY 
Mary L. Clark*
Abstract: This paper looks to several land use planning issues at stake in 
both the World Trade Center redevelopment and Central Artery/ 
Tunnel Project, offering some lessons for the future of public open 
space planning with respect to the inºuence of the press, the centrality 
of politics, the urgency of addressing public and private claims of land 
ownership, the need to engage the public, and seizing the opportunity 
to create new public transportation links. 
Introduction 
 This paper focuses on ªve issues raised by the World Trade Cen-
ter redevelopment that have direct application to Boston’s Central 
Artery/Tunnel Project: (1) questions of the public versus private na-
ture of the site; (2) the role of public consultation in open-space 
planning; (3) the selection of, and reliance on, a master plan; (4) the 
use of landªll produced by site excavation; and (5) the use of the 
building project as an opportunity for creating new public transporta-
tion services. My central concern is for the future applicability of the 
New York and Boston experiences. I argue that they are not sui generis 
as many commentators have suggested; rather, these two examples 
offer important lessons in open-space planning writ large. 
I. The Public Versus Private Nature of the Site 
A. The World Trade Center 
 In the period immediately following the end of the Second World 
War, it was uncertain whether New York City would remain a viable 
business center in the face of an increasingly globalized commercial 
                                                                                                                      
* Visiting Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law. 
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realm.1 The original World Trade Center project was developed in 
response to this concern, principally by New York Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller and his brother, Chase Manhattan Bank Chair David 
Rockefeller.2 The Port of New York Authority3 was brought into the 
World Trade Center project for two main reasons: (1) as a state 
agency—indeed as a bi-state agency—the Port Authority possessed 
bonding power—that is, it could ªnance the project by selling bonds;4 
and (2) the Port Authority had eminent domain power to condemn 
private lots in order to clear land for the towers and other related 
construction.5
 The sixteen-acre parcel on which the World Trade Center com-
plex was built was originally composed of thriving electronics shops, 
giving rise to the neighborhood’s moniker, “Radio Row.” In exercising 
its eminent domain power to clear this land, the Port Authority relied 
on the stated public purpose of “world trade.”6 Whether such a pur-
                                                                                                                      
1 See James Glanz & Eric Lipton, City in the Sky: The Rise and Fall of the 
World Trade Center 49 (2003) (“[M]ingling with the sweet smell of fruits and vegetables 
along the waterfront now was a whiff of fear that the preeminence of Manhattan’s port 
could be challenged, could even come to an end if something was not done.”); Carol 
Willis, Introduction to The Lower Manhattan Plan: The 1966 Vision for Downtown 
New York 11 (Carol Willis ed., 2002) (“This modernization answered an urgent need, for 
as the [1966] statistics and analysis . . . demonstrate, downtown was in danger of complete 
eclipse. A major problem was the exodus of corporate headquarters and jobs to midtown 
and beyond . . . . Choked by trafªc and challenged . . . by its congested physical conditions, 
downtown was in jeopardy.”). 
2 The Chase Manhattan Bank completed a new headquarters building in Lower Man-
hattan, directly opposite the eventual World Trade Center site, in 1969. With the move-
ment of many Wall Street ªrms to midtown, the bank did not wish to stand alone down-
town. See Willis, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
3 At the time of the original World Trade Center development, the Port Authority was 
known as the Port of New York Authority. Glanz & Lipton, supra note 1, at 47. In 1972, it 
changed its name to Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to recognize the joint 
control by the two states, though nothing in its substantive governance changed at that 
time. See id. at 52. 
4 See, e.g., Alexander Garvin, The American City: What Works, What Doesn’t 
361 (2d ed. 2002); Glanz & Lipton, supra note 1, at 52; Paul Goldberger, Up From 
Zero: Politics, Architecture, and the Rebuilding of New York 22 (2004) 
(“[T]urning the World Trade Center over to the Port Authority . . . meant that Rockefeller 
did not have to carry the enormous cost of the project on his state budget.”). 
5 See Glanz & Lipton, supra note 1, at 39 (“The easy answer was that without the Port 
Authority—without its power to condemn land . . . —there would be no World Trade Cen-
ter . . . .”). There was a third advantage to having the Port Authority oversee construction 
of the World Trade Center towers: the agency’s ability, as a government entity, to work 
beyond the constraints of New York City’s zoning and building codes. See Goldberger, 
supra note 4, at 59. 
6 This stated purpose was challenged and upheld in Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port 
of New York Authority, 190 N.E.2d 402, 404–05 (N.Y. 1963). The Supreme Court granted 
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pose would be recognized today may be addressed by the Supreme 
Court this term. 
 A mere six weeks before the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Port 
Authority leased all of the ofªce space contained within the towers for 
ninety-nine years to Silverstein Properties, Inc., owned by New York 
City real estate developer Larry Silverstein.7 This lease poses 
signiªcant complications for the redevelopment of the World Trade 
Center site. By effectively granting Silverstein an ownership interest in 
the ofªce space,8 even while recognizing the Port Authority’s ongoing 
ownership interest in the underlying land,9 the lease requires the Port 
Authority to work closely with Silverstein in rebuilding the site.10
                                                                                                                      
certiorari and subsequently dismissed the action on jurisdictional grounds for lack of a 
“substantial federal question.” Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 375 U.S. 
78 (1963). As Zygmunt Plater has observed, the issue ultimately at stake in Courtesy Sand-
wich Shop was whether “the New York Port Authority [could] use eminent domain to build 
an ofªce building to be used by private corporations from all over the world.” Zygmunt 
J.B. Plater & William Lund Norine, Through the Looking Glass of Eminent Domain: Exploring 
the “Arbitrary and Capricious” Test and Substantive Rationality Review of Governmental Decisions, 
16 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 661, 683–84, 686–87 (1989). The U.S. Supreme Court recently 
heard argument in a case posing a related question—whether moving a parcel to a higher 
tax base is a sufªciently public use for eminent domain purposes. Kelo v. City of New Lon-
don, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn.), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 27(2004). 
7 Ronald Smothers, Leasing of Trade Center May Help Transit Projects, Pataki Says, N.Y. 
Times, July 25, 2001, at B7 (discussing the World Trade Center lease). At the same time 
that the Port Authority leased all of the ofªce space to Silverstein, it entered into a long-
term lease with Westªeld America, Inc., to operate the underground retail space located at 
the World Trade Center. See Charles V. Bagli, Retail Operator at Trade Center Is Pulling Out of 
the Deal, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 2003, at B1. New York Governor George Pataki celebrated 
the World Trade Center leases as a major victory for the Port Authority, enabling the 
agency to return to its core mission of transportation management by getting out of the 
business of real estate development. After the September 11 attacks, the Port Authority 
bought out Westªeld’s lease, gaining a degree of ºexibility over the site’s redevelopment. 
See id. At approximately the same time, the Port Authority repaid Silverstein’s mortgage on 
the ofªce space, originally held by the General Motors Assurance Corporation, thereby 
gaining even greater ºexibility over the site’s redevelopment. See Sabrina Tavernise, Settle-
ment in Trade Center Dispute, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 2003, at B4. 
8 Long term leases, particularly when of a 99-year duration as here, create fee simple-
like ownership interests, especially given understandings of the life expectancies of build-
ings, typically considered no more than forty to forty-ªve years. See Michael T. Madison 
et al., Modern Real Estate Finance and Land Transfer 2 (2d ed. 1999). Thus, as Alex 
Krieger noted at the Symposium, we may think we are planning for perpetuity when we 
undertake major urban redevelopment projects, but our plans are inevitably subject to 
forces of growth, change, and destruction. Alex Krieger, Remarks at the 2004 Boston Col-
lege Environmental Affairs Law Review Symposium, The Law and Planning of Public Open 
Spaces: Boston’s Big Dig and Beyond (Oct. 7, 2004). 
9 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-35.61 (2000); N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 6612 (2000). The Port 
Authority’s reversionary interest in the ofªce space becomes possessory at the expiration 
of the lease term. Note that relevant New York and New Jersey laws allow the Port Author-
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 In late February 2004, the Port Authority, together with the 
Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC), announced its 
intention to negotiate the purchase of, or, if necessary, seek condem-
nation of, the Deutsche Bank site immediately to the south of the 
original World Trade Center parcel.11 Such expansion of the site fa-
cilitates the rebuilding of the entire ten million square feet of ofªce 
space obligated in Silverstein’s lease.12 Consistent with the original 
lease, Silverstein will have a long-term leasehold interest13 in any 
ofªce space developed on this new parcel, while the Port Authority 
will own the underlying land.14
                                                                                                                      
ity to transfer sites to a Port Authority subsidiary, but do not provide for outright transfer, 
that is, sale, to private or commercial entities. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-35.61; N.Y. Uncon-
sol. Law § 6612. 
10 Goldberger, supra note 4, at 16. At times, the Port Authority has acted with surpris-
ingly little deference to Silverstein, as evident by his near exclusion from the master plan 
selection process. See discussion infra Part III. At other times, the Port Authority’s defer-
ence to Silverstein has been notable, as was the case with its ªdelity to his lease obligation 
to replace all of the ofªce space lost in the event of the towers’ destruction. This may well 
have been motivated by the widely held perception, until recently, that Silverstein was the 
only ªgure with the money to pay for the rebuilding, in light of the insurance proceeds 
from the loss of the towers. With Silverstein’s defeat in much of the post-September 11 
insurance litigation—most signiªcantly, over whether September 11 involved one or two 
attacks, that is, one or two insured events—it has become increasingly clear that he will not 
have the funds to pay for all or even most of the ofªce space reconstruction. See Alex Fran-
gos, Uncertainties Soar at Ground Zero: Freedom Tower Is Under Way, But Financing Plan Is Lack-
ing for Rebuilding of Entire Site, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 2004, at B1. Thus, the question now is 
whether the Port Authority will hold Silverstein to his obligation of full replacement of the 
ofªce space, or whether the parties will negotiate a compromise. 
11 See Charles V. Bagli, As He Visits New PATH Terminal, Governor Praises the Pace of the Re-
building Effort, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 2003, at B3. Former Senator George Mitchell was ap-
pointed by New York Governor George Pataki to mediate a dispute between Deutsche 
Bank and its insurer, Allianz Insurance, regarding coverage for damage rendered by the 
falling towers. Allianz maintained that the building could be restored for less than the cost 
of its demolition. See id. The resolution of this dispute was a necessary ªrst step for the Port 
Authority to purchase or condemn the Deutsche Bank parcel for expansion of the World 
Trade Center site. See id. 
12 See David W. Dunlap, How a Verdict Could Change the Future of Downtown, N.Y. Times, 
May 1, 2004, at B1. The site’s purchase was reported to have been completed in August 
2004, but recent reports suggest otherwise. See David W. Dunlap, Last Piece of Trade Center 
Puzzle May Not Be an Easy Fit, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 2005. 
13 That interest would be based on the remaining balance of the 99-year lease at that 
time. See David W. Dunlap, Pataki Backs New Tunnel Under the East River, N.Y. Times, May 6, 
2004, at B4. 
14 See Katia Hetter, Silverstein Scrambles for WTC Funds; Billions for Rebuilding Effort at 
Stake in Bid to Prove to Jury Attacks Were Separate, Newsday (N.Y.), Oct. 21, 2003, at A59. Sil-
verstein expressed concern that acquisition of the Deutsche Bank site not expose him to 
greater property tax liability: “Silverstein wants assurances that his taxes won’t increase 
because some of the 10 million square feet of ofªce space moves off the trade center site 
onto city land.” Id. 
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 Adding to the complexity of the ownership interests at stake in the 
World Trade Center redevelopment are several other claims to owner-
ship of the site. For example, New York City, led by Deputy Mayor Dan-
iel Doctoroff’s ofªce, recently asserted ownership of the land underly-
ing the streets that crossed the site before its late 1960s consolidation as 
a superblock.15 The city threatened to withhold building permits for 
the redevelopment unless some of those streets were reopened.16 The 
city also advocated a land swap that would have given it signiªcant con-
trol over the site’s redevelopment.17 That proposal, involving a transfer 
of the land underlying the World Trade Center for that underlying La-
Guardia and JFK airports—historically leased by the Port Authority 
from the city—was rejected in the fall of 2003.18
 Upon rejecting the city’s land swap proposal, the Port Authority 
agreed to make payments of $14 to $55 million per year in lieu of real 
estate taxes on the World Trade Center site.19 As a government 
agency, the Port Authority is not obligated to pay property taxes, but, 
as is often done, the Port Authority undertook a commitment to make 
payments in lieu of taxes.20
 The question of tax liability for the World Trade Center property 
has a fascinating history. In the 1960s, New York City joined a suit 
against the Port Authority seeking to stop the original World Trade 
Center project because of the city’s concern for loss of real estate tax 
revenue on the site, which had previously been a thriving commercial 
                                                                                                                      
15 See David W. Dunlap, Mayor’s Ofªce Seeks More Retail Space at Ground Zero, N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 29, 2003, at B3. 
16 See id. The city has suggested that it might withhold permits for the World Trade 
Center redevelopment absent agreement by the Port Authority to reopen certain streets 
crossing the site, speciªcally Greenwich Street, running north-south, and Fulton Street, 
running east-west. See id. The city’s push to reopen the street grid echoes its 1960s opposi-
tion to closing these streets for the towers’ original construction. At that time, the city at-
tempted to block the project by asserting its authority to issue, or withhold, permits for 
developments impacting the city’s ownership interest in the streets. Glanz & Lipton, su-
pra note 1, at 145–46. 
17 See Goldberger, supra note 4, at 129. 
18 See Michael Cooper, City Offers Longer Airport Leases for $700 Million and More Rent, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 2003, at A1. Cooper writes: 
 The agreement formally ended talks of a so-called land swap in which the 
city was to have traded the land under the two airports, which it owns, to the 
Port Authority in exchange for the World Trade Center site, which the au-
thority owns. The city had proposed the trade to win more control over the 
rebuilding of the site. 
Id. 
19 Id. The amount of the payment in lieu of taxes is to increase as the site is rebuilt. Id. 
20 See id. 
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zone paying ample taxes. This effort failed. Then, immediately follow-
ing the Port Authority’s entry into the lease with Silverstein, the city 
sued Silverstein, seeking to establish his real estate tax liability on the 
World Trade Center site. This action was stayed in New York Supreme 
Court following the September 11 attacks, and was subsequently re-
solved when the Port Authority agreed to signiªcantly increase its 
payment in lieu of taxes. 
 In addition to the city’s claims to the World Trade Center site, 
Congress recently considered—though did not vote on—a proposal to 
grant National Historic Landmark status to the site in light of its role 
in the events of September 11.21 The proposal, introduced by Repre-
sentatives Carolyn Maloney of Long Island and Christopher Shays of 
Connecticut, would have transferred title to the footprints underlying 
the twin towers to the federal government for historic site designa-
tion, thereby preventing private or commercial development in per-
petuity.22
 The mix of public and private ownership interests at stake in the 
World Trade Center necessarily complicates any land use planning for 
the site. While the particular complexities of title are unique, the 
practical reality of such a mix is not. Boston’s Central Artery/Tunnel 
Project (Big Dig), like the World Trade Center site, also presents a 
mix of claims for control by city, state, federal, and private parties, to 
which I will now turn. 
B. Comparison with the Big Dig 
 The master plan for the twenty-seven acres of new surface land 
created by the Big Dig indicates that 75% of the land is to be used as 
open space, with 25% allocated for modest development, principally 
of a low-rise retail and residential nature.23 The 75%-25% split reºects 
the site description stated in the project’s environmental certiªca-
tion.24 That 25%, or more, of the surface land may be used for devel-
                                                                                                                      
21 World Trade Center Site Historic Study Act, H.R. 3471, 108th Cong. (2003). The bill 
was introduced in the House on November 6, 2003 “[t]o authorize the Secretary of the 
Interior to conduct a special resource study of the area at or near the footprints of the 
former World Trade Center towers for possible inclusion in the National Park System to 
commemorate the tragic events of September 11, 2001.” Id. 
22 See id. 
23 Indeed, symposium participants suggested that the open space-to-development ratio 
will more likely approximate 45% to 55%. 
24 John DeVillars, Massachusetts’s former Secretary of Environmental Affairs, issued 
the environmental certiªcation for the Big Dig project, requiring that 75% of the new 
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opment raises questions for the public versus private control of the 
site. One immediate question is whether the parcels earmarked for 
development are to be sold outrightly or leased. The Massachusetts 
Turnpike Authority (MTA) has indicated that the parcels will not be 
subject to sale to private parties, and thus will only be subject to 
lease.25 Even so, a follow-up consideration is whether they might be 
subject to long-term leases, approximating ownership interests, simi-
lar to that which is at stake in the World Trade Center site. 
 After years of rancorous debate over proposals to create a trust to 
manage the newly created surface land, the Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy 
Greenway Conservancy was established in July 2004.26 While the MTA 
has not divested itself of its ownership interest in the land by virtue of 
joining the conservancy, it has, practically speaking, been joined at 
the decisionmaking table by a number of credible forces that may well 
impact the MTA’s ability to exert autonomous control over the site, 
thereby paralleling the Port Authority’s experience with the World 
Trade Center site. 
 Staying for the moment with questions of complex claims to 
ownership or control of land, note that Spectacle Island—which was 
signiªcantly rebuilt using land excavated by the Big Dig,27 is now part 
of the Boston Harbor Islands National Recreation Area, supervised by 
                                                                                                                      
surface land be used for “public open space,” a rule later enacted into the city’s zoning 
law. 
25 Fred Yalouris, Director of Architecture and Urban Design for the Massachusetts 
Turnpike Authority, stated at the symposium that the MTA had no intention of selling any 
of the land at issue to private parties. Fred Yalouris, Remarks at the 2004 Boston College 
Environmental Affairs Law Review Symposium, The Law and Planning of Public Open 
Spaces: Boston’s Big Dig and Beyond (Oct. 7, 2004). 
26 Anthony Flint, Pact Reached on Greenway Management: Turnpike Will Help Jump-Start 
Conservancy, Boston Globe, July 12, 2004, at A1 (reporting that “[t]he city, the Romney 
administration, and the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority have agreed to establish an 
independent, nonproªt organization to run the Rose Kennedy Greenway, ending years of 
political turf battles over the parklands and development set for the footprint of the old 
Central Artery.”). According to IssueSource, 
The deal called for the Turnpike Authority to pay for all operational and 
maintenance costs through 2012 and to match, dollar-for-dollar, the money 
raised by the conservancy (up to $5 million). In return, the Turnpike got the 
right to appoint ªve of the 10 conservancy board members and [MTA Chair-
man] Amorello was granted the power to appoint the executive director. The 
state and the city got two appointments each and the Kennedy family got one. 
IssueSource, Issue: Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy Greenway/Surface Artery, at http://www.02133.org/ 
issue.cfm?ID=50&Mode=ChronLong (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
27 See infra Part IV.B. 
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the National Park Service.28 This suggests a further parallel with the 
World Trade Center site and the claim for federal preservation at is-
sue there. 
C. Lessons Learned from the New York and Boston Experiences 
 The New York and Boston examples demonstrate the necessity of 
clarifying questions of complex claims of site ownership and control 
before proceeding with any major urban planning efforts. These 
questions have signiªcant implications for the autonomy of land use 
planning, ºexibility of decisionmaking, and even practical considera-
tions of tax liability and revenue.29
II. The Role of Public Consultation in Open Space Planning 
A. World Trade Center Redevelopment 
1. Overview 
  New York Governor George E. Pataki established the LMDC in 
November 2001 to work with the Port Authority and other stakeholders 
in overseeing redevelopment planning for Lower Manhattan.30 Ap-
proximately two-thirds of the original LMDC board was appointed by 
Governor Pataki, with a handful of members named by outgoing mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani and incoming mayor Michael Bloomberg.31 John 
Whitehead, former chair of Goldman Sachs, was named chair of the 
board, a position he maintains today.32
                                                                                                                      
28 Boston Harbor Islands Partnership, Park Overview, at http://www.bostonislands.org/ 
manage/manage_park_overview.html (last modiªed Dec. 23, 2004). 
29 For in-depth treatment of these issues, see Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law 
(5th ed. 2003), and Daniel R. Mandelker & John M. Payne, Planning and Control of 
Land Development: Cases and Materials (5th ed. 2001). 
30 Press Release, Ofªce of the Governor of New York, Governor, Mayor Name Lower 
Manhattan Redevelopment Corp. (Nov. 29, 2001), available at http://www.state.ny.us/gov-
ernor/press/year01/nov29_1_01.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). The LMDC was estab-
lished as a subsidiary of the Empire State Development Corporation, and is chaired by 
Charles Gargano, who also serves as vice chair of the Port Authority. Gargano was ap-
pointed to both positions by Pataki. The current LMDC Executive Director is Kevin 
Rampe, likewise appointed by Pataki. The $21 billion in federal aid earmarked by Con-
gress for the post-September 11 recovery was channeled to the LMDC through New York 
State. See Charles V. Bagli, Report Fuels Fear that City Won’t Get All of Promised 9/11 Aid, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 6, 2003, at B1. 
31 See Michael Sorkin, Starting From Zero: Reconstructing Downtown New York 
53 (2003); Press Release, supra note 30. 
32 Press Release, supra note 30. 
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 Among other things, the LMDC has established a series of advi-
sory groups, composed of victims’ family members, downtown busi-
ness interests, downtown residents, and other interested parties.33 In 
conjunction with these advisory groups, the LMDC has conducted a 
series of public hearings on various aspects of the World Trade Center 
redevelopment, including selection of the master plan and planner 
and consideration of the public memorial design.34
 Among the LMDC’s “principles for action” are to “[m]ake deci-
sions based on an inclusive and open public process” and to “[a]ssist 
the rapid revitalization of Lower Manhattan, in a manner that does 
not preclude desirable future development plans.”35 To what extent 
has the LMDC abided by these principles in its planning process, and 
to what extent does the LMDC serve as a model for public open space 
planning moving forward? For that, we return to the rebuilding story. 
 In the spring of 2002, the LMDC commissioned the Beyer Blinder 
Belle architecture ªrm to create six alternative designs addressing the 
then-recognized demands for the World Trade Center site.36 The de-
signs were to account for the rebuilding of all of the ofªce space cited 
in the lease; creation of a memorial, open space, one or more cultural 
institutions, and an expanded transit hub; and the re-opening of one or 
more streets transecting the site.37
                                                                                                                      
33 See Goldberger, supra note 4, at 64–65. 
34 See Press Release, Lower Manhattan Dev. Corp., Port Authority and Lower Manhat-
tan Development Corporation Unveil Six Concept Plans for World Trade Center Site, Ad-
jacent Areas and Related Transportation ( July 16, 2002), http://www.renewnyc.com/ 
news/displaystory.asp-id=28.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
35 Press Release, Lower Manhattan Dev. Corp., Lower Manhattan Development Corpo-
ration Announces Principles for Development and Blueprint for Renewal for World Trade 
Center Site (Apr. 9, 2002), http://www.renewnyc.com/news/DisplayStory.asp-id=14.asp 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
36 Edward Wyatt, Design Firm Chosen to Oversee Rebuilding of Lower Manhattan, N.Y. Times, 
May 23, 2002, at B1 (“Beyer Blinder Belle . . . was chosen yesterday as the urban planning 
consultant to oversee the rebuilding of Lower Manhattan.”). 
37 See Press Release, supra note 34. The LMDC states that 
[a]ll of the proposed options have common elements, including: 
• A permanent memorial 
• Public open space 
• 11 million square feet of commercial ofªce space 
• A 600,000 square-foot hotel and 600,000 square feet of retail space 
• A transportation hub serving New York and New Jersey 
• Cultural and civic institutions 
• A rebuilt St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church 
• Residential facilities off-site 
Id. 
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 In July 2002, the LMDC hosted a “Listening to the City” event to 
generate feedback on the six designs.38 Over 5000 members of the 
public with varying afªliations gathered to speak of their aspirations 
for the World Trade Center site, resoundingly rejecting all of the 
Beyer Blinder Belle proposals.39 Among other things, participants 
showed familiarity with Jane Jacobs’s concern for preserving and 
promoting the life of the street.40 Participants likewise echoed Ja-
cobs’s emphasis on welcoming mixed uses, nurturing organic com-
munities, and connecting communities to one another, whereas the 
original World Trade Center project had isolated Battery Park City to 
the west and TriBeCa to the north.41
 Shortly after the July 2002 event, the LMDC announced an open 
competition for selection of a master plan and planner that, the 
agency underscored, would provide a guiding vision for the site, but 
not the actual building speciªcations.42 After the ªeld was winnowed 
from more than four hundred entries, Daniel Libeskind of Studio 
Libeskind was selected as the site’s master planner.43 His winning 
                                                                                                                      
38 See Edward Wyatt, A Forum on Rebuilding Lower Manhattan, N.Y. Times, July 20, 2002, 
at B4. 
39 See Edward Wyatt & Charles V. Bagli, Visions of Ground Zero: The Public; Ofªcials Re-
think Building Proposal for Ground Zero, N.Y. Times, July, 21, 2002, at A1. Two of the universal 
criticisms of the Beyer Blinder Belle plans were that the six designs did not differ notably 
from one another, and that they were too constrained by the lease obligation to replace 10 
million square feet of ofªce space. See id. “[T]hey wanted bolder, more innovative designs 
and asked the planners to seek other ways to fulªll the lease requirements for commercial 
and retail space.” Id. 
40 Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961). 
41 See Edward Wyatt, Support Builds for One Plan for Center Site, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 2003, 
at B1 (“Some members of Community Board No. 1 have also said they dislike the way the 
sunken portion of the Libeskind plan cuts off Battery Park City from the rest of the trade 
center site—a complaint often voiced about the World Trade Center itself.”). See generally 
Jacobs, supra note 40. 
42 See Julie V. Iovine, Ground Zero Spotlight: Architects Ambivalent, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 2003, at 
E1 (“The development corporation has frequently said that the object of the competition, a 
master land-use plan, is not to ‘include the detailed architecture of individual structures.’ But 
many architects worry that the teams’ detailed models and impressively realistic video presen-
tations will encourage the public to perceive them as concrete plans.”); Press Release, Lower 
Manhattan Dev. Corp., Lower Manhattan Development Corporation Announces Design 
Study for World Trade Center Site and Surrounding Areas (Aug. 14, 2002), http:// 
www.renewnyc.com/News/DisplayStory.asp-id=30.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
43 In February 2003, the master plan ªeld was narrowed to two entrants, THINK, 
formed by Rafael Vinoly and other architects, and Studio Libeskind. See Edward Wyatt, 
Design Chosen for Rebuilding at Ground Zero, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 2003, at A1. Governor Pa-
taki met privately with each of the ªnalists, and reportedly favored the Libeskind plan. See 
id. 
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plan, Memory Foundations, includes a series of ofªce towers, the tall-
est and most ambitious being Freedom Tower.44
 Following Libeskind’s selection, the LMDC announced an open 
call for the site’s memorial design in the fall of 2003.45 The LMDC re-
ceived over 5200 responses.46 As part of its selection process, the me-
morial design committee heard testimony throughout the metropolitan 
region from victims’ family members, as well as from the general public 
and other interested parties.47 The victims’ families were given a private 
viewing of the memorial design ªnalists and were reported to have had 
a signiªcant impact on the ultimate design selection.48
 With the memorial design competition underway, in April 2004 
the LMDC invited cultural institutions to compete to be housed at the 
site.49 This was a direct response to the public’s criticism of the origi-
nal project, from which cultural institutions had been strikingly ab-
sent. More than 110 submissions were received, with two principal art 
institutions—the Joyce International Dance Center and the Signature 
Theatre invited to join the site.50
                                                                                                                      
44 See David W. Dunlap, 1,776-Foot Design Is Unveiled for World Trade Center Tower, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 20, 2003, at A1. Freedom Tower is intended to be the tallest building in the 
world. Id. 
45 Visions for Ground Zero; What’s Next, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 2002, at B10. (“After the 
[master] plan is ªnished, the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation begins an in-
ternational design competition for a memorial on the site, with the goal being selection of 
a design memorial by Sept. 11, 2003.”). 
46 See David W. Dunlap, The Ground Zero Memorial: The Competition; Presenting Several Ver-
sions of the Shape of Grief and Recollection, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 2003, at B3. 
47 See Press Release, Lower Manhattan Dev. Corp., LMDC and Port Authority Extend 
Public Outreach Campaign to All Five Boroughs and New Jersey (Aug. 19, 2002), http:// 
www.renewnyc.com/News/DisplayStory.asp-id=32.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
48 Press Release, Lower Manhattan Dev. Corp., The Lower Manhattan Development 
Corporation & Port Authority of New York & New Jersey Announce Selection of Studio 
Daniel Libeskind: Memory Foundations as Design Concept for World Trade Center Site 
(Feb. 27, 2003), http://www.renewnyc.com/news/displaystory.asp-id=51.asp (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2005). 
49 See Press Release, Lower Manhattan Dev. Corp., The Lower Manhattan Development 
Corporation Announces Number of Submissions Received from Institutions Interested in 
Locating or Proposing Cultural Programs on The Future World Trade Center Site, (Sept. 
24, 2003), http://www.renewnyc.com/News/DisplayStory.asp-id=81.asp (last visited Apr. 
10, 2005). 
50 See id. Two other smaller cultural institutions are likewise to be included at the 
World Trade Center site: The Drawing Center and the International Freedom Center. See 
Lower Manhattan Dev. Corp., Cultural Institutions on the World Trade Center Site, at http:// 
www.renewnyc.com/ProgramsResources/CulturalCivic.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
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2. Reºections on What Happened and Why It Happened that Way 
 As this brief history indicates, the public, both in New York and 
beyond, has had genuine input into, and impact on, the shape of the 
World Trade Center redevelopment decisionmaking and the ªnal 
product itself. How has this happened, and why? 
 A key element throughout the process has been the inºuence of 
the New York press. Regular columns by Herbert Muschamp, David 
Dunlap, James Glanz, and Eric Lipton of the New York Times,51 as well 
as occasional editorials,52 brought signiªcant inºuence to bear on the 
redevelopment decisionmaking process and outcomes.53
 Beyond the inºuence of the press, discussions with key players in 
the redevelopment decisionmaking process suggest that promotion of 
the LMDC’s credibility, assurance that the public would “buy into” the 
ªnal product, and concern for redressing the top-down decisionmak-
ing and closed-door management of the original World Trade Center 
project motivated the LMDC to engage the public as it did. 
B. Comparison with the Big Dig 
1. Overview 
 The initial absence of public consultation regarding the Big Dig by 
the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA) led the Conservation 
Law Foundation to sue to compel the MTA to employ a more transpar-
ent public consultation process.54 Since that time, the MTA has held a 
                                                                                                                      
51 See Glanz & Lipton, supra note 1; see, e.g., David W. Dunlap, Architects’ Clashing Vi-
sions Threaten to Delay World Trade Center Tower, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 2003, at B1; Herbert 
Muschamp, Critic’s Notebook: Vision vs. Symbols and Politics at Ground Zero, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
29, 2003, at B9. All four have reported, and continue to report, on various aspects of the 
World Trade Center redevelopment, with Muschamp, the chief architectural critic, report-
ing primarily on the design element, David Dunlap and Eric Lipton reporting on city poli-
tics, and James Glanz reporting principally on the engineering of the site. 
52 Maureen Dowd, Editorial, The Unbearable Lightness of Memory, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 
2003, § 4, at 9 (castigating the eight memorial ªnalists for failing to depict the despair 
wrought by September 11). 
53 Paul Goldberger’s writings in the New Yorker were similarly inºuential. See, e.g., 
Goldberger, supra note 4. Architecture critic for the New Yorker, Dean of the Parsons 
School of Design, and former New York Times architecture critic, Goldberger has written 
extensively on the World Trade Center redevelopment. 
54 See Peter J. Howe, Big Dig Pact a Powerful Tool for Environmental Change, Boston 
Globe, Mar. 14, 1992, § Metro, at 29. According to the Conservation Law Foundation web-
site, in 1991, “State highway ofªcials in Massachusetts agree[d] to implement measures to 
reduce air pollution, including rail and transit improvements, as part of Boston’s Central 
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number of public forums to plan for the new surface space.55 It has also 
provided liaisons to neighborhoods affected by the construction.56
 The Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) has played host to 
an ongoing public meeting convened by the Mayor’s Central Artery 
Task Force to discuss open space planning for the Big Dig. The Task 
Force serves a principally advisory role,57 and the MTA continues to 
exert decisive control over the project. 
 Besides the MTA and the BRA, a mix of private individuals and 
interests formed the Beyond the Big Dig project to bring together 
business leaders, landscape architects, urban planners, academics, 
community advocates, and others in a series of so-called Creative 
Community Conversations.58 These meetings allowed members of the 
public to exchange ideas concerning potential uses of the newly cre-
ated open space.59 The Beyond the Big Dig project also included a 
Town Forum hosted at Faneuil Hall in 2002, at which a panel of dis-
tinguished citizens presented its recommendations for the project, 
and heard testimony from local respondents. 
                                                                                                                      
Artery project.” Conservation Law Found., CLF’s Environmental Legacy, at http://www.clf. 
org/general/internal.asp?id=59 (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
55 Peter DeMarco, Ideas for Big Dig Space Include Dog Runs, Jog Path, Cafes, Boston 
Globe, Apr. 14, 2002, at A27. 
56 The liaisons’ role is to answer questions, respond to comments and complaints, and 
keep the neighborhoods informed of the project’s construction and design. See, e.g., Lisa 
Chong, Ideas for South Bay Are Plenty, Sampan (Boston), http://www.aaca-boston.org/Sam-
panWeb/ehtml/2004/0305/south.htm (last updated Feb. 20, 2004). 
57 See Thomas C. Palmer, Jr., Surface Artery Park Proposals Draw Fire: Task Force Calls Five 
Designs Uninspiring, Boston Globe, Apr. 25, 2003, § Metro, at B7. 
58 The Boston Globe, Creative Community Conversations, http://www.boston.com/be-
yond_bigdig/conversations (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
59 According to the Boston Globe: 
 More than 350 people took part in a pair of public events [sponsored by 
the Boston Foundation and the Boston Society of Architects], called Creative 
Community Conversations, about the future of the parks that will be devel-
oped above and beyond the Big Dig. 
 Participants shared ideas for uses of the Big Dig parkland, drawing upon 
memories and experiences of urban open space that works, with special em-
phasis on what would keep them coming back again and again. 
 . . . . 
 The ideas generated were offered as guidance for designers and deci-
sionmakers as they plan how to use the newly created parkland. 
Id. 
314 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 32:301 
2. Reºections on What Happened and Why It Happened that Way 
 Two key elements of the New York experience were altogether ab-
sent from the Big Dig project: the national security crisis represented by 
the September 11 attacks, and the substantial inºuence exerted by the 
World Trade Center victims’ families. These elements provoked greater 
public engagement in New York than might otherwise have occurred, 
or than has happened with Boston’s Big Dig project. 
C. Lessons Learned from the New York and Boston Experiences 
 Both the New York and Boston experiences highlight the chal-
lenge of engaging in genuine community-based decisionmaking in 
the face of signiªcant political and economic constraints. The ongo-
ing dominance of the Port Authority in New York and the Massachu-
setts Turnpike Authority in Boston is arguably out of step with the 
public’s increasingly sophisticated understanding of land use needs 
and concomitant expectation for transparency of process. 
 Starting with the World Trade Center, despite the ongoing public 
engagement process there, the decisionmaking has been too politi-
cized, too secretive, and too hurried. By “too politicized,” I mean not 
only the rhetoric of the 1776-foot Freedom Tower and Park of Heroes, 
as Libeskind’s open space was originally called,60 but more importantly, 
Governor Pataki’s central role in orchestrating the most signiªcant 
elements of the redevelopment process.61 By “too secretive,” I refer to 
the high-level, closed-door meetings to select Libeskind as master plan-
ner and later hammer out a compromise between Libeskind and David 
Childs, the site planner and architect.62 Finally, by “too hurried,” I 
mean the obedience to deadlines which were insisted upon by Gover-
nor Pataki throughout the process, driven largely by his re-election 
concerns, and subsequently, by his goal that the Freedom Tower 
groundbreaking coincide with the Republican National Convention in 
August 2004.63 It was only in response to intense public pressure that 
                                                                                                                      
60 Press Release, supra note 48; see Dunlap, supra note 44, at A1. 
61 Bagli, supra note 11. 
62 For more discussion, see infra Part IV. 
63 Dunlap, supra note 44, at A1 (“Governor Pataki had asked that the cornerstone for 
the Freedom Tower be laid by the third anniversary of the attack. Though this falls within 
two weeks of the Republican National Convention, Mr. Pataki said in a telephone interview 
that there was ‘zero’ connection.”); Robin Pogrebin, The Incredible Shrinking Daniel 
Libeskind, N.Y. Times, June 20, 2004, § 2, at 1 (“Those close to the process say his loyalty was 
consistent: not to a particular aesthetic vision but to whoever could guarantee a ground-
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Governor Pataki moved the date of the Freedom Tower groundbreak-
ing away from the Convention to July 4, 2004, nevertheless in keeping 
with the politicized rhetoric characterizing redevelopment of the site.64
III. Selection of and Reliance on a Master Plan 
A. World Trade Center Redevelopment 
1. Master Planning Process Generally 
 As noted earlier, Libeskind’s master plan was selected from more 
than 400 entries and a ªeld of highly regarded ªnalists.65 Throughout 
the master plan selection process, the LMDC insisted that it was not 
selecting the actual blueprint for the site but, rather, a “vision.”66 The 
actual blueprint, the public was told, would be left to the project ar-
chitects in consultation with the relevant authorities.67
 Not only did this invite potential (later realized) for substantial 
conºict between the master planner and the actual project architect, 
but there was also potential for conºict between the LMDC and the 
Port Authority in implementing the master plan. To their credit, the 
two planning agencies entered into a memorandum of understanding 
                                                                                                                      
breaking in time for the opening of the Republican National Convention.”). Herbert 
Muschamp also reported: 
If the design process were not held hostage to the fast-track timetable ap-
proved by Gov. George E. Pataki, there would be less pressure to substitute 
symbolic manipulation for thought. If the timetable were not tied, however 
coincidentally, to the Republican National Convention to be held in New 
York in August, there would be less temptation to mistake politics for culture. 
Muschamp, supra note 51. 
64 David W. Dunlap, Rebirth Marked by Cornerstone at Ground Zero, N.Y. Times, July 5, 
2004, at A1 (reporting, “In the dusty bowl of ground zero, a garnet-speckled granite cor-
nerstone was laid yesterday for the Freedom Tower, the tallest skyscraper planned at the 
World Trade Center site.”). 
65 See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
66 See supra text accompanying note 42. 
67 See David W. Dunlap & Edward Wyatt, Leaseholder Sees Limited Role for Libeskind at 
Trade Center, N.Y. Times, May 30, 2003, at B3. Dunlap & Wyatt reported: 
 Larry A. Silverstein, the leaseholder of the World Trade Center site, said 
yesterday that Studio Daniel Libeskind would inspire but not actually design 
the ofªce buildings he is planning there . . . . 
 Roland W. Betts, a director of the Lower Manhattan Development Corpo-
ration, said in an interview last week that there was “no expectation that 
Libeskind would design the different buildings.” 
Id. 
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whereby the LMDC agreed to oversee the cultural and memorial ele-
ments of the site redevelopment, while the Port Authority concen-
trated on the commercial ofªce and retail space reconstruction.68
 A key question for our purposes, given similar reliance on a master 
plan in Boston, is the extent to which Libeskind’s master plan has been 
followed in New York, and why or why not. What we ªnd is that there 
have been broad—and, I would assert, unsurprising—departures from 
Libeskind’s master plan, both with respect to Freedom Tower and the 
memorial design. 
2. Freedom Tower 
 The planning of Freedom Tower, the most ambitious building 
anticipated for the World Trade Center redevelopment, exploded 
into a very public struggle for control between Libeskind and David 
Childs, Silverstein’s personal architect. Spilling onto the pages of the 
New York Times and elsewhere,69 the conºict became so fetid that Gov-
ernor Pataki mediated a highly publicized compromise, whereby 
Childs was recognized as the design architect for Freedom Tower, and 
Libeskind the collaborating architect.70
 Thereafter, the LMDC announced a revised master plan,71 with 
ªnal plans for Freedom Tower departing signiªcantly from Libeskind’s 
original vision, from matters of size and placement on the parcel, to 
issues of the shape and torque of the building. While Libeskind antici-
pated a tower directly echoing the Statue of Liberty in its twisting, turn-
                                                                                                                      
68 Lower Manhattan Dev. Corp., World Trade Center Memorial and Cultural 
Program General Project Plan: Proposed Amendments December 16, 2004, at 1 (2004), 
at http://www.renewnyc.com/content/pdfs/WTC_GPP_Site_Plan_Amendments_Dec_2004. 
pdf. 
69 See, e.g., Dunlap, supra note 51. (“Only 10 months before groundbreaking is ex-
pected to take place for the Freedom Tower at the World Trade Center site, the master 
planner of the site and the architect for the tower’s developer, who are supposed to be 
collaborating, have reached an impasse on how the skyscraper should look.”); Pogrebin, 
supra note 63 (“The wrestling for control of the Freedom Tower became daily fodder for 
the news media for several weeks running.”). 
70 See Dunlap, supra note 44. Since that time, Silverstein announced the hiring of three 
more star architects to work with Childs and Libeskind in developing the remaining ofªce 
space at the World Trade Center site. In October 2003, the New York Times reported Silver-
stein’s hiring of Sir Norman Foster of London, Jean Nouvel of Paris, and Fumihiko Maki 
of Tokyo, further complicating, and possibly limiting, Libeskind’s role as master planner. 
David W. Dunlap, The Roster of Ground Zero Architects Grows, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2003, at B4. 
71 See generally Lower Manhattan Dev. Corp., Partial Action Plans, at http://www.renew 
nyc.com/FundingInitiatives/partialact_plans.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
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ing manner,72 Childs’s tower slopes directly upward and is capped by a 
series of complex radio towers and wind-power-generating cables.73
3. Memorial Design 
 Not only did the design of Freedom Tower depart signiªcantly 
from Libeskind’s master plan, but so did the winning design for the 
memorial, to be located on the site of the original towers’ foot-
prints.74 Michael Arad’s design, entitled, “Reºecting Absence,” and 
supplemented by the work of landscape designer Peter Walker, is fun-
damentally different from Libeskind’s proposal, which, among other 
things, did not anticipate depression of the memorial below ground 
level.75
B. Comparison with the Big Dig 
 In the early 1990s, the MTA announced its ªrst master plan for 
the Big Dig site.76 That was supplemented in 2000–01 by a parcel-by-
parcel master plan for the twenty-seven acres of new open space.77 
Teams were selected to design the ªnal parcels in 2002–03, to be 
completed by 2005.78 Thus, the Big Dig, like the World Trade Center 
redevelopment, has seen two master plans. 
 One of the elements called for by the more recent Big Dig master 
plan is a “Garden Under Glass,” the pet project of the Massachusetts 
Horticultural Society. To what extent does this Garden play a role 
parallel to that of the memorial at the World Trade Center site? While 
not a memorial, and while the Big Dig site does not have the tragic 
history of the World Trade Center, the Garden Under Glass is the 
                                                                                                                      
72 See Marvin Trachtenberg, A New Vision for Ground Zero Beyond Mainstream Modernism, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 2003, § 2, at 54 (“[T]he particular shape of Mr. Libeskind’s spire re-
peats the lines of Liberty’s upraised arm and torch; in fact, the silhouette of the entire 
tower seems to retrace in the sky the contours of the entire statue.”). 
73 Childs intends Freedom Tower to be a leader in “green” architecture, planning for a 
signiªcant percentage of the building’s power to be generated by the wind cables at the 
top. See Dunlap, supra note 44. 
74 See Goldberger, supra note 4, at 225. 
75 See Pogrebin, supra note 63 (“In January 2004, Mr. Libeskind’s plan was further 
eroded with the selection of a memorial design. Mr. Arad’s plan called for the memorial to 
be brought level with the surrounding terrain. Mr. Libeskind’s hallmark, the memorial pit, 
was now to be ºat.”). 
76 See Mass. Tpk. Auth., Project Schedule and Timeline, at http://www.masspike.com/big 
dig/updates/timeline.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
77 See Boston Globe, The History of the Downtown Corridor, at http://www.boston.com/be-
yond_bigdig/timeline/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
78 See id. 
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most self-consciously “public art” element of the Big Dig, and in that 
way parallels the World Trade Center memorial. 
 In stark contrast, however, to Reºecting Absence’s design selec-
tion following a public competition involving more than 5200 en-
tries,79 the proposed Garden Under Glass was not chosen through a 
competition, either open or closed. Rather, it was the only idea—and 
the only design—proffered by the Massachusetts Horticultural Society 
for that site.80 It has generated signiªcant detractors in part because 
of this fact.81
C. Lessons Learned from the New York and Boston Experiences 
 Some have criticized the master plan competition for the World 
Trade Center redevelopment as ºawed in its overweening control by 
Governor Pataki; still others have complained that the memorial 
competition sacriªced quality and dramatic effect in the interest of 
democracy.82 Directly in tension with advocacy of a transparent public 
engagement process, some have argued that an autocratic, top-down 
selection of a memorial designer would have produced a more com-
pelling design than did the actual public competition.83 It is notewor-
thy then that the Garden Under Glass bypassed any manner of public 
engagement or competition. 
IV. Use of Landªll Generated by Site Excavation 
A. Original World Trade Center Development 
 Battery Park City was built on the landªll excavated by the original 
World Trade Center project.84 Generally perceived as a success story, 
                                                                                                                      
79 Dunlap, supra note 46. 
80 See Jo Levy, Paved Parking Lot Becomes Paradise, at http://boston.about.com/cs/ 
attractions/a/glass_garden.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
81 Robert L. Turner, Glass Act: A Spectacular Winter Garden Is the Centerpiece of the Massa-
chusetts Horticultural Society’s Plan for the Parkland Above the Depressed Central Artery. But Can 
the Society Get the Job Done?, Boston Globe, Mar. 30, 2003, (Magazine), at 10, available at 
http://www.boston.com/beyond_bigdig/news/artery_033003_magazine_1.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 10, 2005). 
82 See Goldberger, supra note 4, at 226. 
83 See Pogrebin, supra note 63. 
84 See Garvin, supra note 4, at 361; see also Glanz & Lipton, supra note 1, at 177. 
(“[T]he excavated soil from the foundation would be poured into the Hudson to create 
the newest piece of Manhattan real estate at Battery Park City.”); Willis, supra note 1, at 13 
(“Battery Park City . . . was created in its ªrst stage of landªll from the excavations for the 
Trade Center.”). 
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Battery Park City is nevertheless substantially cut off from the rest of 
Lower Manhattan.85 Today’s redevelopment planning is seen as an op-
portunity to connect Battery Park City to Lower Manhattan by reopen-
ing streets closed by the formation of  the original superblock.86
B. Comparison with the Big Dig 
 As part of the Big Dig, Spectacle Island—a former city dump— 
received 3.7 million cubic yards of clay and dirt to cap the dump and 
create new topsoil for a park.87 Spectacle Island is now part of the Bos-
ton Harbor Islands National Recreation Area, supervised by the Na-
tional Park Service.88 As with Spectacle Island, material produced by 
the Big Dig excavation was used to cap Quarry Hills and create a new 
recreation area for that neighborhood.89
C. Lessons Learned from the New York and Boston Experiences 
 Both the New York and Boston experiences suggest the creative 
potential for landªll generated by excavation of a large urban devel-
opment site. In New York, the excavated landªll enabled the con-
struction of allegedly middle-income housing in the urban downtown. 
In Boston, the excavated landªll enabled the capping of a dump that 
was thought to be leaking into the harbor and the creation in its place 
of new major green space. What remains to be seen is whether Spec-
tacle Island in particular becomes a destination for Boston urbanites 
and others. As with Battery Park City, the question is one of access. 
V. Creating New Public Transportation Opportunities 
A. World Trade Center Redevelopment 
 It is ªtting that we conclude our discussion of lessons learned 
from the World Trade Center and Big Dig with issues of public trans-
portation opportunities created by large-scale open-space projects be-
cause, in many respects, that is where both projects began. The origi-
                                                                                                                      
85 See, e.g., Garvin, supra note 4, at 363–64. 
86 See, e.g., Goldberger, supra note 4, at 48. 
87 See Mass. Tpk. Auth., Spectacle Island, at http://www.masspike.com/bigdig/parks/ 
spectacleisland.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
88See Nat’l Park Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Boston Harbor Islands, at http://www. 
nps.gov/boha/index.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
89 See Mass. Tpk. Auth., Quarry Hills Project, at http://www.masspike.com/bigdig/back-
ground/quarryhills.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
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nal World Trade Center project took its shape in signiªcant part from 
mass transit concerns.90 Initially, the project was conceived for Man-
hattan’s lower east side, but was quickly moved to the west side to ad-
dress concerns of the then-New Jersey governor, who, as co-director of 
the Port Authority board, insisted that the World Trade Center be lo-
cated closer to New Jersey for purposes of better access to jobs, etc.91 
In addition to addressing these concerns, the Port Authority agreed 
to assume management of the failing Hudson and Manhattan sub-
Hudson rail line from the New Jersey government.92 In fact, the tow-
ers were built on the site of the rail line’s former headquarters.93 The 
rail line was re-named the PATH train,94 which continues to operate 
today, connecting Lower Manhattan with northern New Jersey. 
 As part of its current redevelopment planning, the LMDC com-
missioned a study of post-September 11 transportation options for 
Lower Manhattan.95 Completed in May 2004, the report prioritized 
downtown New York’s transportation needs as follows: 
                                                                                                                      
90 See Glanz & Lipton, supra note 1, at 51–61; Goldberger, supra note 4, at 22. 
91 Glanz & Lipton note: 
New Jersey abruptly balked on the entire World Trade Center plan . . . . 
 . . . New Jersey governor Robert Meyner made the plain observation that a 
pile of ofªce buildings, parking lots, and exhibition space on the east side of 
Manhattan did not seem to have a hell of a lot to do with New Jersey. . . . If 
the Port Authority was going to spend millions of dollars on new infrastruc-
ture, Meyner wanted the money to go toward saving the H&M. 
See Glanz & Lipton, supra note 1, at 55. Similarly, Willis states: 
The Port Authority had tentatively agreed to develop that complex [on the 
east side], but in 1961 the site shifted to the Hudson River waterfront in a po-
litical accommodation with New Jersey interests that required the agency to 
take over the bankrupt Hudson and Manhattan Railroad and tubes and to 
operate them as the PATH commuter rail system. 
See Willis, supra note 1, at 14. 
92 See Glanz & Lipton, supra note 1, at 56. 
93 See id. at 57. Glanz and Lipton write: 
If they would have to tear down the H&M terminal buildings anyway, Sullivan 
thought, why not save themselves a lot of trouble and put the World Trade 
Center right on top of a new train terminal? Moving the trade center from 
the east side to the west would mean that not only the H&M buildings but 
acres of the surrounding cityscape would also have to be razed. . . . 
 . . . [N]o major structures would have to be demolished except the H&M 
terminal buildings themselves. 
Id. 
94 See id. at 59. 
95 See Lower Manhattan Dev. Corp., Transportation Priorities for Lower Manhattan (“In 
May, 2004 the results of a coordinated study on a new rail line between Lower Manhattan 
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• Access to JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark Liberty International air-
ports;96 
• Lower Manhattan Transit Complex;97 
• Bus Facilities and Below-Grade Infrastructure;98 and 
• Ferry service.99 
 There has been active consideration of using the World Trade 
Center redevelopment as an opportunity to link Lower Manhattan 
with the three major regional airports: LaGuardia in Queens, JFK on 
Long Island, and Newark in New Jersey.100 The PATH train to Newark 
airport is already running, and the LMDC continues to study the fea-
sibility of establishing a baggage check-in for JFK Airport in downtown 
Manhattan, where security is a major concern.101
 Finally, one element of the expanded transit hub is a direct trans-
fer to the subway from the PATH train, which was previously unavail-
able. The PATH station has already reopened on the World Trade 
Center site,102 making it the ªrst element of Libeskind’s master plan 
to bear fruit. 
                                                                                                                      
and Long Island and JFK Airport were released. A year ago, Governor Pataki charged a 
multi-agency team with identifying a feasible option for the rail link.”), at http://www.re-
newnyc.com/plan_des_dev/transportation/default.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
96 Lower Manhattan Dev. Corp., Lower Manhattan Transportation Strategies 
57 (Apr. 24, 2003) (estimating a cost of $525 million and an implementation period of 
seven to eight years), available at http://www.renewnyc.com/plan_des_dev/transporta-
tion/pdf/all_pages.pdf. 
97 Id. at 22–27. The complex will consist of a new PATH terminal located on the World 
Trade Center site, as well as a new Fulton Street Transit Center at Broadway and Fulton. 
The PATH terminal, which will be completed over a three to six year period, is estimated 
to cost $1.7 to $2 billion. The Fulton Street Transit Center, which will be completed over a 
three to four year period, will cost $750 million. Id. 
98 Id. at 36–40. A secure facility for the storage of tour and charter buses is expected to 
accommodate between 75 and 150 buses daily. Id. The location of the facility has not yet 
been determined, though the cost of the bus facility and below-grade infrastructure work 
is estimated at $500 million. Id. 
99 Id. at 76–83. Enhancing and expanding ferry service to Lower Manhattan is planned 
as a means of linking Lower Manhattan to the region. Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 66. 
102 See David W. Dunlap, Again, Trains Put the World in Trade Center, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 
2003, at A1 (“The World Trade Center PATH Station opened at 2 p.m. after a $323 mil-
lion, 16-month reconstruction, to applause and tears along the platforms and aboard the 
trains.”). 
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B. Comparison with the Big Dig 
 Like the original World Trade Center project, the Big Dig took its 
shape from concerns for transportation, albeit of a very different 
sort—cars, not trains. The master plan for the Big Dig open space in-
cludes reference to a water shuttle dock on parcel 24, located at Rus-
sia Wharf between Congress Street and the Evelyn Moakley Bridges.103 
Presumably, this shuttle dock represents ferry service to Logan Air-
port, located across from the Wharf District. Whether the Big Dig pro-
ject was seen as an opportunity to improve Boston’s mass transit infra-
structure and not just submerge its major highways underground is 
unclear, though the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA) and 
Massport are listed as key partners on the project’s ofªcial website.104
C. Lessons Learned from the New York and Boston Experiences 
 In light of the fact that the Big Dig project was initiated largely 
out of concern for transportation congestion in downtown Boston, 
whereas the World Trade Center redevelopment was undertaken in 
the wake of a national security crisis, it is striking the extent to which 
it is New York, and not Boston, that has used the resulting planning 
process to consider how best to create new or expanded public trans-
portation opportunities. While planning ofªcials in New York have 
studied possibilities for the expansion of the region’s mass transit sys-
tems, ofªcials in Boston largely have not. 
Conclusion 
 In reºecting on the World Trade Center and Big Dig projects, I 
return to where I began: to what extent are these examples sui generis, 
or are there lessons to be learned for public open space planning 
generally? 
 The New York and Boston experiences teach us much about the 
types of constraints placed on public open space planning. One un-
surprising but critical lesson is, of course, for the centrality of politics 
                                                                                                                      
103 Mass. Tpk. Auth., Parcel Land Use, available at http://mtanew.ashtonservices.com/ 
pdf/big_dig/parcel.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
104 The ofªcial Big Dig website listed key partners as including: the Massachusetts 
Turnpike Authority (of which the Big Dig project is a part); the Federal Highway Admini-
stration; the Massachusetts Highway Department; the Metropolitan District Commission; 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the MBTA; Massport; and the City of Boston. “Big-
dig.com” has now been merged with the MTA website. See Mass. Tpk. Auth., The Big Dig, at 
http://www.masspike.com/bigdig/index.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
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to any land use planning.  Other transferable lessons include: recog-
nition of the inºuence of the press, as with the New York Times’s re-
porting on the World Trade Center and the Boston Globe’s reporting 
on the Big Dig project; constraints on the autonomy and ºexibility of 
decisionmaking presented by the complex public and private owner-
ship of land; the potential for using excavated landªll to create new 
urban spaces; and the potential for generating new public transporta-
tion opportunities through open space planning. 
 I look forward to seeing how these lessons are applied to urban-
centered public open space planning in the future. 
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